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This paper complements the existing knowledge in the renegotiation lit-
erature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegoti-
ations. We ﬁrst propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which
both Pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of
the government can occur. We then perform an empirical analysis based on
a sample of 307 water and transport projects in ﬁv eL a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e s
between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous
literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having
a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap
regulatory schemes, there are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences as predicted by the
model, in particular with respect to the eﬀect of investment and ﬁnancing,
as well as the corruption variables. We provide additional evidence showing
that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with
weak governance and political opportunism.
11 Introduction
The 1990s witnessed a spectacular wave of private sector participation in
infrastructure. Considering the four infrastructure sectors, transport, water,
energy and telecommunications, US$ 754billion was invested between 1990
and 2001 in around 2,500 projects with private sector participation in de-
veloping countries (see Harris, 2003). Of this, 48% was directed to Latin
America and the Caribbean, where these investments were in their majority
related to the sale or concessioning of existing assets. Due to political and
sometimes constitutional and legal reasons making outright privatization dif-
ﬁcult, concessions have been the salient choice for private sector participation.
They have accounted for 67% of all projects worldwide, being moreover the
almost exclusive form of private sector involvement in water and transport,
as well as some energy projects. A concession provides its holder the right to
operate a service for a limited period of time (usually 20 to 30 years), at the
end of which all the assets revert back to the government. The concessionaire
is responsible for all investments as well as any other obligations speciﬁed in
the contract in exchange for the right to the cash-ﬂow of the users’ payments.
However, by the early 2000s, a growing disenchantment with private sec-
tor involvement in general and concessions in particular has forced govern-
ments to slow down or stop the program and reform process in practically
all countries in Latin America. Annual ﬂows of investment are well below
their 1997 peak. There are clearly doubts that stem from the slow pace of
improvements (at least relative to build-up expectations), and the frequent
conﬂicts that arose in the past between contractual parties, with a large num-
ber of projects having been renegotiated or taken over by governments (see
Guasch, 2004, for a detailed description of the Latin American experience
with concessions).
In line of its relevance and impact, the motivation of this research is to
identify the triggers and determinants of renegotiation. In principle, renego-
tiation, when properly used, can enhance welfare. However high incidence
does raises concerns about the validity of the model. In particular, renegoti-
ation can reduce or eliminate the beneﬁts of competitive bidding. If bidders
believe that renegotiation is likely, their incentives and bids will probably be
aﬀected, and the auction might not select the most eﬃcient provider, but the
most skilled at renegotiation1.
1Other costs linked to renegotiations are discussed below.
2In a previous paper that focused on the analysis of ﬁrm-led renegotiation
(Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub, 2003, referred to hereinafter as GLS), we ana-
lyzed a Latin American data set from the World Bank, with 307 concession
projects in the sectors of transport and water, in ﬁve countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) between 1989 and 2000. We showed
that more than half of these projects were renegotiated (162 out of 307)
and very fast, on average 3.5 year after the signing of the contract. The
paper focused on ﬁrm-led renegotiation and built a model of renegotiation
that included contract characteristics, regulatory and institutional environ-
ment, as well as external shocks. The empirical analysis there conﬁrmed
most of the predictions of the model and yielded interesting policy implica-
tions, especially with respect to the importance of having a regulatory body
in place at the time of awarding a concession and of choosing the appropri-
ate regulatory regime. We showed that the mode of regulation matters and
t h a tp r i c ec a p s ,w h i c hh a v eb e e nt h ed o m i n a n tc h o i c eo fp o l i c ym a k e r si n
Latin America, suﬀer from a great fragility to shocks and trigger signiﬁcant
renegotiation. As a consequence, therei sag r o w i n gp r a g m a t i ct e n d e n c yt o
advocate the abandonment of price cap regulation, a synonym for the higher
risk of renegotiation and higher cost of capital, and the return to an hybrid
type of regulation, including some elements of rate of return (see for example
Estache, Guasch and Trujillo, 2003).
The present paper complements GLS by looking at government-led rene-
gotiations. Private sector participation has often been accompanied by sector
restructuring prior to the transfer and by the implementation of a legal and
regulatory framework. This is meant to protect investors from arbitrary and
politically motivated intervention from the government, to protect users from
the abuse of the monopoly or dominant position of the new private operators,
and also to protect the competitive new entrants from a dominant incum-
bent operator. Quite often, the required and necessary investments are highly
speciﬁc “sunk” type costs that cannot easily be recouped if the economic or
political atmosphere deteriorates or if the operator were to discontinue op-
erations. This may tempt governments to behave opportunistically and take
ex post regulatory actions that expropriate the available quasi-rents.
Typical scenarios are a government or a mayor in the case of water con-
cessions (mayors have exclusive jurisdiction on water operations) deciding in
a unilateral fashion to cut tariﬀs or not to honor agreed tariﬀ increases during
a re-election campaign to secure popular support. Another not uncommon
scenario is a new administration deciding not to honor the tariﬀsi n c r e a s e
3stated in the concession contract granted by the previous administrations.
Examples, to mention only a few (see Guasch 2004 for more detailed evi-
dence), include recent popular unrest in Bolivia, which led in January 2005
to the cancellation of the La Paz and El Alto water concession, led by the
French multinational Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux. As of 2005, most of the
concessions awarded in Argentina prior to the 2001 crisis are still under-
going protracted renegotiation processes. Conﬂi c ta r o s ea st h eg o v e r n m e n t
converted the dollar-denominated rates to devalued pesos despite contract
clauses that contemplated indexation to the dollar and US inﬂation, and
refused any subsequent signiﬁcant rate adjustment. Despite 62 ﬁrms’ suits
before the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, Argentina has been very slow in responding to those challenges,
arguing the need to protect the interest of the Argentinian people. It has
also argued that international arbitrage decisions should be reviewed by lo-
cal judicial courts, despite the country’s agreement to abide to international
arbitration, under bilateral investment treaties signed by the government
of Carlos Menem in the 1990s2. Similarly, the Limeira water concession in
Brazil was denied tariﬀs adjustment that was supposed to be automatic ac-
cording to the contract. The local mayor argued that the contract, signed by
a previous administration, was unfair and compromised the municipality’s
long term interests. Similar behavior plagued the Tucuman water and san-
itation contract in Argentina. In 1995, a new local government took oﬃce
and sought to limit previously agreed upon tariﬀ increases. This ﬁnally led
the concessionaire to abandon the concession in 1996. In the toll road con-
cession in Pernambuco, Brazil, the regional government decided to cut the
tariﬀs unilaterally shortly before elections. Sometimes, lack of commitment
shows up at even earlier stages, like in the case of the 1997 Ukranian cellular
telephone contract or the 1999 Matarani port concession in Peru, where the
rules of the tender were changed unilaterally in the awarding period (intro-
ducing an additional annual fee in one case, shortening the duration of the
concession from 30 to 15 years in the other one).
In most cases, the social costs of such renegotiations are likely to be
high. The knowledge by potential investors that the temptation exists to
expropriate investments ex post may discourage investment in the ﬁrst place
or it might require an additional risk premium in the form of bigger tariﬀso r
2See The Economist, March 17, 2005, and IPS-Inter Press Service, April 11, 2005,
“Economy-Argentina, the Battle that Lies Ahead” at http://www.ipsnews.net/index.asp.
4smaller transfer price. That possibility is the main source of regulatory risk,
impacting costs of capital and, consequently, tariﬀs levels. The extent of that
added regulatory risk component is not trivial. The estimates, depending on
country and sector, range from 2 to 6 percentage points to be added to the
cost of capital (Guasch and Spiller 1999), with a substantial impact. For
example an increase of 5% in the cost of capital leads to a reduction of the
oﬀered transfer fee or sale price of about 35% or equivalently it requires an
increase in tariﬀs of about 20%. In the water concession in the city of Buenos
Aires, the regulator granted a tariﬀ increase of 3.5% for each percentage point
increase on the cost of capital.
There is also ample anecdotal evidence documenting other potential costs,
including large scale service disruption, failure to meet coverage expansion
targets (e.g. the airport concession in Lima, Peru, awarded in 2001 and
renegotiated in 2003, and the Buenos Aires water concession, abandoned two
years into the contract after unsuccessful renegotiation attempts) and cost
pass-through to users or taxpayers in excess of initial agreements (examples
include the Buenos Aires water concession discussed above, as well as most
toll road schemes, like the ones in Colombia and in the Dominican Repub-
lic). An extreme example is the Mexican toll road program, comprising 52
highways built under private concessions in the early 1990s, which was ﬁnally
bailed out by the government in 1997 at an estimated cost of between US$7
to 12 billion (1 to 1.7% of GDP)3.
From a theoretical point of view, government-led renegotiations represent
ad i ﬀerent challenge than ﬁrm-led ones. Indeed, if ﬁrms have private informa-
tion and anticipate opportunistic behavior by the government, for example
because it is not able to commit not to renegotiate, they may want to hide
their information to protect future rent. The resulting ratchet eﬀect (see
for example Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993) may give rise to extremely complex
situations. We address this issue by extending the GLS framework to two or
more periods, thus explicitly incorporating political cycle considerations in
the analysis. We show that the condition of the static model, ensuring that
the good ﬁr md o e sn o tw a n tt om i m i ct h eb a do n ea n dr e n e g o t i a t e ,c a r r i e s
over to the dynamic framework. In this case, the opportunity for Pareto im-
proving renegotiations at the initiative of the government exists in the second
period, with the ﬁrst period outcome representing the status quo in this new
renegotiation.
3See Guasch, 2004, for details and discussion on these and other cases.
5Moreover, to account for the possibility of opportunistic behavior by
governments, we introduce the possibility that, when a new government is
elected, there is a small chance that it expropriates the rents secured by the
ﬁrm in the initial contract. If the probability of this outcome is not too large,
no ratchet eﬀect occurs and we have a model displaying both Pareto improv-
ing and rent shifting government-led renegotiations. If it is large, there is
ratchet eﬀect or no investment at all, so no renegotiation occurs.
As a result, we obtain an equation for the probability of government-led
renegotiation that allows us to derive theoretical predictions for the main
variables in our analysis. While the direction of the eﬀects are unchanged for
a number of variables, like shocks or the existence of a regulator, theory leads
to expect opposite eﬀects in the case of the variables aﬀecting the status quo
of the parties in an eventual renegotiation, namely the ﬁnancing variables
(investment requirements and private ﬁnancing) and institutional quality.
We then present empirical results based on the same sample as in GLS,
using as dependent variable the occurrence of a renegotiation at the initiative
of the government. From the empirical viewpoint, a number of diﬀerences
with ﬁr m - l e dr e n e g o t i a t i o n sa r ea l s ot ob ee x p e c t e d . O n eo p e nq u e s t i o n
is the inﬂuence of price cap regulation. Firms’ calls for renegotiation were
the intuitive outcome when the cap appeared to be too restrictive. Here,
we could expect a reverse eﬀect, in the sense that governments would like
to renegotiate caps that proved too generous and leave excessive proﬁts to
the ﬁrms (the opportunistic calls). However, it could also be the case that
governments concerned about the continuity of service or the realization of
planned investments would step in when ﬁrms are making losses, resulting in
a similar eﬀect of price cap on ﬁrm-led and government-led renegotiations.
Another aspect of interest is the behavior of variables aﬀecting the status
quo of the parties in a renegotiation, in particular the ﬁnancing variables,
which eﬀect should be the opposite as with ﬁrm-led renegotiation. Finally,
it is not clear how institutional quality variables should behave, as a number
of channels involving the quality of the bureaucracy and the possibility of
capture can be envisioned. Indeed, corruption can be expected to give rise to
hidden and non-transparent renegotiations (e.g. the Mexican Northeast Rail-
way concession or the generic case of highway franchising in Latin America,
discussed in Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2003), or on the contrary to pro-
duce ex ante biased awards through direct adjudication or the manipulation
of insider information, resulting in a situation in which concessionaire and
government representatives share excessive rents and have little incentive to
6renegotiate (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
The results on both the importance of having a regulator and the fragility
of price caps are unchanged with respect to ﬁrm-led renegotiation. On the
other hand, consistently with the theoretical predictions, investment and ﬁ-
nancing variables have reversed eﬀect, as does corruption. Moreover, we
present additional evidence showing that the role of an experienced and in-
dependent regulator is especially important in contexts characterized by weak
governance and high likelihood of political expropriation. This is certainly
an important result, as it shows that strong and experienced regulators are
likely to act as barriers against political opportunism, especially when they
are present at early stages of concessions’ lives.
Section 2 below spells out the model and discusses potential extensions,
Section 3 presents the data and the empirical evidence, and Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Theory: Government-led Renegotiations
2.1 Political Cycle
To account for the possibility that at some point during the life of the project,
the regulatory body may propose to the ﬁrm a renegotiation of the initial
contract, we explicitly introduce political cycle considerations.
Consider that the contract that will be described below is signed for two
periods4. At the beginning of the second period (time t =2 ), elections take
place and the incumbent government is reelected with exogenous probability
q. With probability 1 − q, a new government is elected and then remains in
power throughout the second period. The reason to consider the probability
of a political change as exogenous is that regulatory issues are unlikely to be
pivotal in shaping the outcome of elections5.
4As will become clear, this could be extended to 3 or more periods without changes.
Note that in our sample more than 97% of the contracts are signed for between 20 and 30
years.
5This assumption, introduced for example by Besley and Coate (2003) in the context
of US data, seems reasonable in normal electoral processes. In recent Peruvian events,
widespread popular opposition to the privatization of electricity generation in Arequipa,
in 2002, can be deemed partly responsible for the resignation of the cabinet of President
Toledo in 2003, although the president himself remained in power and no elections were
held.
7Moreover, we assume that the initial government has the ability to engage
in long term contracting that goes beyond its own term in power. We also
assume it can commit itself to its policy (commit not to renegotiate), so
that if it remains in power, no government-led renegotiation oﬀer is made.
However, when a change of majority occurs, the new government has the
ability to renegotiate, with the initial contract representing the status quo
utility level of the ﬁrm. Thus, the ﬁrm may refuse the new contract it is
oﬀered and carry on with the initial one. As discussed in Aubert and Laﬀont
(2002), most constitutions grant governments, acting as representative of
the State, the ability to commit to long term contractual agreements, as is
the case when concession contracts lasting for several decades are drafted.
However, it also gives new governments the ability to modify to some extent
the agreements made by their predecessors. This provides for the necessary
ﬂexibility to modify bad agreements, or those that have become not suitable
anymore due either to changes in the preferences of the parties or of the
population as a whole, or to shift in environmental parameters. So, a newly
elected government makes a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation oﬀer to the ﬁrm,
b u th a st os t i c kt ot h eo r i g i n a lc o n t r a c ti fi t so ﬀer is turned down.
Additionally, we assume that with a small probability µ, the newly elected
government does not respect its legal obligations and it reneges on the out-
standing contract, in eﬀect expropriating the ﬁrm’s rent. In this context,
it is intuitive to think about the probability of expropriation as a shortcut
to the country’s level of political risk, which is known in expectation by the
investing ﬁrm and guides its decision to apply for the concession ex ante. It
therefore makes sense to keep it exogenous, as it is likely to depend on factors
lying outside the scope of a given concession6.
2.2 The Contract
We consider the concession of a natural monopoly which, in addition to
a common knowledge necessary sunk investment, or ﬁxed cost, F,h a sa
6While political risk assessment is widely used by ﬁrms investing in developing coun-
tries, some extreme and unforeseeable cases of commitment breakdown seem to be driven
more by governments’ inability to manage shocks, as the following quote from Harris
(2003) suggests: “For their part, some investors over-estimated the ability of governments
to manage the reform process and hence honor their tariﬀ, and other, commitments. In
some cases, such as in Indonesia and Argentina, this extended to judgments about the
ability of the government to sustain stable macroeconomic policies.”
8variable cost function7:
C =( β − e)q. (1)
where q is the production level, β is a cost parameter known only by the








and e is an eﬀort
variable (moral hazard) which decreases cost, but creates to the manager a
disutility Ψ(e) with Ψ0 > 0, Ψ00 > 0, Ψ000 ≥ 0.
Consumers derive utility S (q), S0 > 0, S00 < 0 from the consumption of
the good. With p(.) being the inverse demand function and ˆ t the transfer
from the regulator to the ﬁr m ,i nt h es i m p l ev e r s i o no ft h eG L Sm o d e l ,w e
can write the ﬁrm’s net utility as:
U = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F − Ψ(e). (2)
Assume that cost is ex post observable by the regulator as well as the price
and the quantity. Making the accounting assumption that revenues and cost
are incurred by the regulator, who pays a net transfer t = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β −
e)q − F, the participation constraint of the ﬁrm becomes:
U = t − Ψ(e)=t − Ψ(β − c) ≥ 0, (3)
where, from (1), we substitute e by β − c,w i t hc = C
q .
The transfer ˆ t is ﬁnanced through taxes, which give rise to a cost of public
funds 1+λ, λ>0, so consumers’ net utility is given by:
V = S (q) − p(q)q − (1 + λ)ˆ t. (4)
Utilitarian social welfare is then given by the sum of consumers’ surplus
and the ﬁrm utility, here with equal weight of 1 for both:
c W = U + V
= S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F + Ψ(e)) − λU. (5)
Note that the regulator dislikes leaving a rent to the ﬁrm, which occurs
as long as the weight of its rent is lower that 1+λ.
7On the basic model, see the discussion and references in GLS.













U =0 , (8)
and we denote q∗,e ∗,U
∗ and q∗,e∗,U
∗
the solutions corresponding to β
and β respectively.
This solution equates the marginal disutility of eﬀort Ψ0 (e) to its marginal
social gain q, while leaving no rent to the ﬁrm because funds are socially costly
(λ>0).
In what follows, we assume that the regulator observes neither the eﬀort
level e nor the cost parameter β.H o w e v e r ,h ei sa b l et oo ﬀer a contract to














From (3), the observability of cost reduces the problem to a simple adverse
selection problem10. From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of gener-







For each message ˜ β = β or ˜ β = β, the welfare maximizing regulatory contract
speciﬁes an average cost to achieve and a net transfer from the regulator, as
well as a production level q (or q) and a total cost C (or C), compatible with
c (or c) (between which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent).
8We make the appropriate assumptions on S (.) so that W is strictly concave in (q,e).
For more details and motivations about the various assumptions, see Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993).
9This timing assumption is not crucial, as is shown in GLS, but simpliﬁes the presenta-
tion of the model. Introduction of a ﬁrm’s limited liability constraint (see below) de facto
takes us back to a standard ex post contracting framework.
10See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002), Chapter 7, on “false moral hazard” models.
10The direct revelation mechanism must satisfy the incentive constraints:


















which can be rewritten:
U ≥ U + Φ(e) (11)
U ≥ U − Φ(e + ∆β), (12)
with Φ(e)=Ψ(e) − Ψ(e − ∆β),Φ0 > 0, Φ00 > 0.
Finally, the ﬁrm’s participation constraint is written ex ante (before it
discovers its type):
νU +( 1− ν)U ≥ 0. (13)
Before writing the regulator’s maximization problem, we discuss the char-
acteristics of the case where the ﬁrm is protected by limited liability, i.e.
U ≥ 0, as in Section 2.5. of GLS. As explained below, this is meant to en-
sure that the ﬁrm is able to repay the loan taken from the bank to ﬁnance
part or all of the sunk cost. Additionally, the ﬁrm owns assets which can
be used as collateral if it incurs some debt. The sunk investment has to be
made before producing, and ﬁnancing may take two forms. The ﬁrm relies
on bank ﬁnancing for the initial investment11, but if private ﬁnancing fails
to cover the needs, the government provides the complement. We introduce
the following notations:
A is the ﬁrm’s assets needed for the project, F is the necessary sunk
investment and K is the part ﬁnanced by banks’ loans, with K ∈ [0,F].I f
K =0 ,w eh a v ec o m p l e t eg o v e r n m e n tﬁnancing, while K = F corresponds
to exclusive private ﬁnancing. For intermediate values of K,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
ﬁnances a share F − K of the investment. The interest rate on the eventual
loan is r.
Considering the required repayment K,t h eﬁrm’s utility level becomes:
U = ˆ t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − (1 + r)K − Ψ(e). (14)
Thus, the regulator includes the constraint that the bank must always be
paid back in his program.
11See GLS for a discussion on the form of the limited liability constraint as well as issues
related to the nature of the bank, the welfare function and to multiparty bargaining.
11Rewriting it in terms of the variables (q,e,U) rather than (q,c,U),l e t
us denote W (q,e,β) the complete information ex post social welfare for a
production level q and an eﬀort level e when the eﬃciency parameter is β,
i.e.:
W (q,e,β)=S (q)+λp(q)q − (1 + λ)((β − e)q + F + rK + Ψ(e)). (15)
We also assume that A<F, so that the ﬁrm is able to repay only a share
of its debt in case of failure. Two cases arise. If K<A , the bank gets K,
while the government gets the remainder A − K, for a net loss F − A.I f
K>A , the bank gets A while the government gets nothing. Summarizing,
the status quo payoﬀsw r i t e :
(−A,−H − F +m a x ( K,A)). (16)
Note that the level of K will aﬀect the status quo payoﬀ of the government
in case of renegotiation, and that there is an additional term H,c a p t u r i n g
other costs like loss of reputation. We assume that a ﬁrm attempts to rene-
gotiate when its ex post utility level after renegotiation is higher than the
utility level speciﬁed in the contract (U
E
> U1 ≥ 0). However, with probabil-
ity π(x), the regulator is nevertheless able to implement the initial contract.
This depends on the level of expenses x incurred to ﬁnance the functioning
of an enforcement mechanism, with π(0) = 0, limx→∞π(x)=1 , πx > 0,
πxx < 0.
With probability 1−π(x), a renegotiation happens. We model it with the
Nash bargaining solution and assume that renegotiation is costly and reduces
a g g r e g a t es o c i a lw e l f a r e( t h i si si n t r u m e n t e db yt h ep a r a m e t e rδ ∈ (0,1)),
f o re x a m p l eb e c a u s ei tt a k e st i m e 12. Moreover, as we discuss extensively in
the following section, we make appropriate assumptions so that the eﬃcient
type ﬁrm never wants to renege on its contract. Therefore, costly bargaining
takes place under complete information, only when β = β.
With the possibility of renegotiation and the disagreement point now








+ H + F − max(K,A) − λA
2λ
. (17)
12If global social welfare is not reduced by renegotiation, building an enforcement insti-
tution has no purpose.
12Events unfold as follows. A ﬁrm discovering to be a bad type β intends
to renegotiate the contract ex post. With probability π(x) it faces tough
enforcement and is obliged to carry on with the project, while with proba-
bility 1 − π(x), it succeeds in forcing a renegotiation. Moreover, we assume
that with some (small) positive probability P the renegotiation breaks down,
yielding the status quo payoﬀs. Anticipating the outcome of the renegoti-
ation, it is optimal for the regulator to modify its oﬀer ex ante. Call U1











=( 1 − ν)(1− π(x))(1 − P)
Pr(U = −F)=( 1 − ν)(1− π(x))P.



























+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))P [−H − F +m a x ( K,A)] − (1 + λ)x (18)
s.t.
νU1 +( 1− ν)π(x)U1
+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))(1 − P)U
E
−(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))PA ≥ 0 (19)
U1 ≥ U1 + Φ(e) (20)
U1 ≥ U1 − Φ(e − ∆β) (21)
U1 ≥ 0 (22)
U1 ≥ 0, (23)
where (19) is the participation constraint written in expected terms and
including the possibility of renegotiation, and (20) and (21) (resp. (22) and
(23)) are the incentives (resp. participation) constraints of the good and the
bad types.
The limited liability constraint of the bad type (23) and either the in-
centive constraint of the good type (20) or the participation constraint (19)







(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))
h







Since renegotiation happens only if U
E
≥ 0,a n dP is small, the second
term in brackets is negative, so it is the incentive constraint (20) that binds.
Substituting the values of U1,U1 and U
E





















− H − F +m a x( K,A)+λA
2
#
+(1 − ν)(1 − π(x))P [−H − F +m a x ( K,A)] − (1 + λ)x. (24)
So the good ﬁrm produces the ﬁrst best level (qE = q∗;eE = e∗), while the
eﬀort and output levels of the bad type are distorted to reduce the expected
















Note that the term π
¡
xL¢
at the denominator implies a stronger distor-















2.3.1 Pareto Improving Renegotiation
In second period, a newly elected government (probability 1−q) makes a take-
it-or-leave-it renegotiation oﬀer to the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm accepts the oﬀer, the
14contract is modiﬁed accordingly. If it rejects it, the original contract remains
unaltered13.
Given the possibility of political change, the initial government does not
alter the contract it oﬀers to the ﬁrm at time t =1 , which is still characterized



















This follows straightforwardly from the fact that this government is not able
to renegotiate the contract if it stays in power in the second period, nor is it
able to shift the allocation of the rent across time14.
The key issue here is to determine whether the fact that a new government
oﬀers to renegotiate the original contract with probability 1 − q will induce
any strategic behavior from the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst place. In other word, we
need to determine whether they will be any ratchet eﬀect.
This question boils down to the problem of whether the good type will
have an interest in mimicing the bad type at t =1in order to secure a
better deal at t =2 . Indeed, given the original contract, at t =2the new
government will only oﬀer renegotiation to the bad type, proposing to raise
the level of production (qL)t ot h eﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lq∗, while maintaining its
rent to the previous level (U
1
=0 ). There is no room for renegotiation with
t h eg o o dt y p e ,a si ti sa l r e a d yp r o d u c i n gt h eﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lq∗ and would
reject any proposal reducing its rent.
The analysis in the present case is greatly simpliﬁed by observing that
the original contract is signed before the ﬁrm actually learns its type. More-
over, just after the initial agreement, the bad type ﬁrm actually intends to
renegotiate its contract. Thus, the only way for a good ﬁrm to mimic a bad
13Such a renegotiation would be a mutually-agreed one, in contrast with the one pro-
voked by the ﬁrm reneging on its contract against the government’s will. We thus make
the additional intuitive assumptions that, being desired by both parties, this renegotiation
is less costly than the ﬁrm-led one. For simplicity, we normalize the cost in the present
case to 1. We could consider a cost e δ such that δ ≤ e δ<1, with similar results overall.
Moreover, note that none of the parties will want to make use of the oﬃcially ﬁnanced
enforcement mechanism (none of them would go to court to try to avoid renegotiation for
example).
14This would only matter if the government were composed of stake-holders of the ﬁrm,
so it would retain some beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s rent even after leaving power. In this case,
it may want to distort the original contract to modify the posterior renegotiation game
between the ﬁrm and its successor (Aubert and Laﬀont, 2002).
15one would be to ask for a renegotiation at t =1 . We have assumed that
in the original model without political change, the good ﬁrm is worse oﬀ if
mimicing the bad ﬁrm and renegotiating. In the case with limited liability
but without political turnover, the equivalent of the condition, spelled out





























E denotes the utility of a good ﬁr mm i m i c i n gab a dﬁrm and renego-
tiating and A stands instead of F as the ﬁrm’s threat point. In the present
case, we must consider the additional fact that at t =2there is a probability
1 − q that qL be increased to the ﬁrst best level q∗, giving rise to a higher
rent for a cheating ﬁrm. We show in the Appendix the shape of the modiﬁed


















w h i c hi ss i m i l a r( i nat w op e r i o df r a m e w o r k )t ot h eo n ei nf o o t n o t e1 3o f
GLS, and which we again assume is satisﬁed.
2.3.2 Rent Shifting Renegotiation
Consider now that with probability µ, the newly elected government does
not stand by its obligation to respect the status quo utility of the ﬁrm and
expropriates its rent, as in the introductory example of an incoming adminis-
tration deciding not to honor tariﬀ adjustment committed by its predecessor.
Two additional instances of renegotiation now occur. First, with probability





.S e c o n d ,w h e naﬁrm-led renegotiation has succeeded
in period 1, the bad ﬁrm enjoys a contract giving it a rent U
E
. Again, with
16probability (1 − q)µ, the government calls for a renegotiation and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer involving a contract (q∗;e∗;0).
It is easy to see that the right hand side of (28) is not modiﬁed, as the
production levels of the bad type ﬁrm remains the same in all cases and so
do the associated good ﬁrm’s rents. However, the left hand side changes as
the utility that accrues to a good ﬁrm choosing the good contract at t =1is
now brought down to 0 with probability (1 − q)µ at t =2 . Condition (28)
becomes:
















If µ is small enough, this inequality is still veriﬁed15.
2.4 Probability of Government-led Renegotiations
Considering that the good type will not want to cheat, we show in Figure 2
below the tree of actions and the eventual occurrence of renegotiation.
Conditional on a political change, the probability of renegotiation at the
initiative of the government is given by the sum of the probabilities to have
a Pareto improving renegotiation (contract with a bad type ﬁrm that was
successfully enforced (1 − ν)π
¡
xL¢
(1 − q)) and a rent-shifting renegotiation
(contract with a good ﬁrm, probability ν (1 − q)µ, as well as renegotiated





(1 − P)(1− q)µ). This
can be rewritten:
Pr(Govt-led renegotiation)=
(1 − q)[µ − (1 − ν)Pµ+( 1− ν)(1− (1 − P)µ)π(x)]. (30)
The important implication of (30) is that any variable of the model af-
fecting the enforcement probability π(x), either directly, like institutional
15We could introduce the possibility that at t =2the expropriated ﬁrm recurs to the
enforcement mechanism (e.g. the court) ﬁnanced previously and manages to have the
initial contract enforced with probability π(x). We abstract from this complication, as the
qualitative results would be similar, with an additional term 1−π(x) on the left hand side
of (29), making it even easier to be satisﬁed.
17variables (see below), or indirectly, like the ﬁnancing aspects that deﬁne
the statu quo of the parties, will have opposite eﬀect on the probability of
government-led versus ﬁrm-led renegotiation.
Following the speciﬁcations introduced in GLS, the next subsection de-
scribes the introduction in the model of additional aspects like institutional
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2.5 Additional Aspects of the Model
Exogenous Macroeconomic Shocks.
We assume that the distribution of ﬁrm’s types is subject to an unantici-
pated noise, so that upon a shock ε, the probabilities of the enterprise being
good or bad become {ν + ε,1 − ν − ε}. This is a shortcut to model a shock
on either cost or demand of a fraction of the ﬁrms that allows us to take into
account unanticipated events. The probability or renegotiation can now be
18written:
Pr(Govt-led renegotiation)= (31)
(1 − q)[µ − (1 − ν − ε)Pµ+( 1− ν − ε)(1− (1 − P)µ)π(x)],
which is decreasing in ε if P is small enough. Thus, as for ﬁrm-led renego-
tiation, positive shocks, such as an increase in demand or a favorable shift
in relative prices of inputs or outputs, reduce the probability of government-
led renegotiation, while negative shocks (decrease in demand, cost shock)
increase it.
Institutional Quality
Consider an enforcement function of the form θπ(x),w h e r et h ep a r a m e t e r
θ stands for the quality of institutions, with a θ closer to 1 corresponding to










Obviously, better institutions (more eﬃcient bureaucracy, less corruption)
translate into a higher level of investment in enforcement. Therefore, it will
increase the probability of government-led renegotiation, as can be seen from
equation (30), contrary to the case of ﬁrm-led renegotiation.
2.6 Model Discussion
Before turning to the empirical evidence, we discuss in this subsection the
characteristics of government-led renegotiations in our model and brieﬂy
mention several potential extensions. We also make reference to the data
used in the empirical analysis below to justify some of our theoretical choices.
Successive Renegotiations.
As it stands, one of the model implications is the possibility of having
successive renegotiations, with a ﬁrm-led call at t =1 , and a government-led
call at t =2 . To be precise, government-led renegotiations can happen in
two diﬀerent cases:
-A st h eﬁrst one in the life of the project16, with probability (1−ν)π(1−
q)+ν(1 − q)µ.
16Although not a ﬁrst attempt to renegotiate in the case of a bad ﬁrm contract that
was successfully enforced.
19- Following a previous ﬁrm-led renegotiation, with probability (1−ν)(1−
π)(1 − P)(1 − q)µ.
While we describe the data in more details in the next section, it is im-
portant to notice that this second case is not at odds with the stylized facts
from the sample. There are indeed a few examples of consecutive renegotia-
tions, like the water concession of Aguascalientes, Mexico, and some Argen-
tinian concessions, including the Buenos Aires water concession17.H o w e v e r ,
this does not appear directly in our data set as, after a renegotiation, the
projects actually leave the sample. They are sometimes brought back in as a
new contract, when it is considered to be diﬀerent enough from the previous
one. Note, moreover, that the probability of having consecutive renegotia-
tions remains small. This ﬁts well the theoretical predictions, as the following
calibration shows.
Considering the total number of projects (307) and the number of renego-
tiations initiated by the ﬁrm (53) and by the government (94) or the govern-
ment and both (109), we get aggregate probabilities of renegotiation initiated
by the ﬁrm of 17%, and between 31 and 36% for the government (see Table
2b e l o w ) .
Setting ν =0 .4 and the probability that the government remains in power
to q =0 .5, and calibrating the probability of enforcement π(x) so that we
get:
Pr(ﬁrm-led renegotiation)=( 1− ν)(1 − π(x)) = 0.17,
g i v e su sav a l u eo fπ(x)=0 .72. We then get:
Pr(Govt-led, ﬁrst renegotiation)
=( 1 − ν)π(x)(1 − q)+ν(1 − q)=0 .24,
and18
Pr(Govt-led, second renegotiation)=( 1−ν)(1−π(x))(1−P)(1−q) ' 0.01.
17Recently, a number of “second round” renegotiations happened in Argentina, after the
devaluation and the economic crash at the end of 2001. These, however, exceed the time
frame of our study.
18In our sample, 16 out of 162 cases of renegotiation led to the cancellation or the
suspension of the project, so we use P =0 .1. Moreover, we set µ =0 .1.
20These numbers ﬁt relatively well the average probabilities shown above
and show that the model supports a scenario in which government-led rene-
gotiations following a previous renegotiation are only a small subset of all
renegotiations at the initiative of the government.
Stationarity of the βs.
Another important point to consider is the question of the stationarity
of the βs in a multiperiod model. When there are successive renegotiations,
it could be questioned whether such a stationarity assumption is realistic.
Given the complexity of the model, however, we leave this issue for further
analysis (see for example Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002) and content ourselves
with observing that this problem is made less relevant by the fact that overall
successive renegotiations are a rather small subset of the total.
Moreover, note that empirically this provides justiﬁcation for the way
projects are handled in our data base. They leave the sample when they are
renegotiated, and enter as a new, diﬀerent project if the concession carries
on with signiﬁcant modiﬁcations, thus avoiding the problems of confusing
projects which distinct underlying technological characteristics.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The Data
We use an original data set, developed by the World Bank, which describes
the characteristics of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin American and
Caribbean countries from 1982 to 200019. As in GLS, and to keep results
strictly comparable, we again focus on water and transport concessions in
ﬁve countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), between 1989
and 2000. We have information on the general details of the projects (sector,
activity, year of award, award criteria, size and duration of the concession), on
the institutional and regulatory context, the type of regulatory framework
put in place (price cap or rate of return), as well as the evolution of the
main economic variables (growth, exchange rate, inﬂation) and the timing of
national and local elections. Table 1 presents the full list and deﬁnitions of
variables used in the analysis below and gives summary statistics.
19See GLS (2003) and Guasch (2004) for additional details on the data set.
21Table 1: List of variables, source and summary statistics
Dummy variables, 1=Yes, 0=No.  Yes  No 
Renegotiation: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a 
renegotiation of the concession contract. 
162 (52.8%)  145 (47.2%) 
Renegotiation initiated by the firm  53 (17.3%)  254 (82.7%) 
Renegotiation initiated by the government  94 (30.6%)  213 (69.4%) 
Renegotiation initiated by both  15 (4.9%)  292 (95.1%) 
Existence of regulatory body: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not 
a regulatory body at the time of the concession first coming into operation. 
180 (58.6%)  127 (41.4%) 
Regulatory body is part of the government ministry: Dummy variable indicating 
whether the regulatory body is constituted as a part of the government ministry or 
not. 
293 (95.7%)  13 (4.3%) 
Price cap: Dummy variable indicating whether the tariff regulation imposed by the 
regulator is a price cap. 
283 (92.2%)  24 (7.8%) 
Investment requirements: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or not 
investment requirements as part of the concession contract. 
235 (76.5%)  72 (23.5%) 
Private financing: Dummy variable indicating whether the project is funded 
entirely through private funds (without any financial investment of the state, 
whether local or national) or not. 
160 (52.1%)  147 (47.9%) 
Bidding process: Dummy variable indicating whether there was or not a bidding 
process to award the concession. 
272 (88.6%)  35 (11.4%) 
Award criteria: Dummy variable classifying award criteria (1 for highest price, 
highest canon or lowest subsidy, 0 for all others) 
106 (34.5%)  201 (65.5%) 
Minimum income guarantee: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a 
government guarantee in terms of minimum income promissory. 
63 (20.5%)  244 (79.5%) 
Arbitration process: Dummy variable indicating whether there is or not a formal 
set of arbitration processes stated in the contract providing for the settlement of a 
dispute between the concession holder and the government, should such a situation 
arise. 
179 (58.3%)  128 (41.7%) 
Election: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not national elections 
(legislative or presidential) in any given year. Source: Political Database of the 
Americas. Georgetown University/Organization of American States. Center for 





Political Change: Dummy variable indicating whether there were or not a change 
in power following national elections (legislative or presidential) in any given 
year. Source: Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown 





Continuous variables  Mean  S.D. 
Duration since award: Indicates the number of years a concession has been in 
operation since its award. 
n.r. n.r. 
Corruption: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide; 
annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6. 
Higher value means less corruption. 
2.94 0.69 
Rule of law: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country Risk Guide; 
annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range from 1 to 6. 
Higher value means better rule of law. 
2.92 0.99 
Bureaucratic quality: Index from Political Risk Service, International Country 
Risk Guide; annual values from 1989 to 1995, and 1998 value after that. Range 
from 1 to 6. Higher value means better bureaucratic quality. 
3.36 0.61 
Growth: Yearly growth rate of GDP in real terms. Source: World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank. 
n.r. n.r. 
Exchange rate: Annual evolution of the real exchange rate (calculated as (index 
rate of year t – index rate of year t-1)/index rate of year t). A positive value 





Note: For variables varying over time, like the election dummy, duration since award, and 
macroeconomic variables, the summary statistics are meaningless and are omitted (denoted by n.r.: non 
relevant). 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the incidence of the diﬀerent types of renego-
tiations (led by ﬁrms, the government or both), crossing countries and years
in the ﬁrst case, countries, sectors and sub-sectors in the second case.
22T a b l e2 :R e n e g o t i a t i o n sb yt y p eo fi n i t i a t o ra n dy e a r
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Argentina
outstanding concessions 1 15 4 3 10 14 23 22 19 11 10 10
N u m b e r  o f  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s0 1 2210013 1 1300 3 3
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g .0 1 2210013 1 0300 3 2
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g .0000000000000
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g .0000000010001
Brazil
o u t s t a n d i n g  c o n c e s s i o n s 1 62 03 65 95 43 0
Number of renegotiations 0 0 0 1 5 24 6 36
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g . 00000000
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g . 00015 2 46 3 6
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g . 00000000
Chile
o u t s t a n d i n g  c o n c e s s i o n s 11369 1 6 1 9 2 0 2 4
N u m b e r  o f  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s 0000001001
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g . 0000001001
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g . 0000000000
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g . 0000000000
Colombia
o u t s t a n d i n g  c o n c e s s i o n s 1 61 82 22 93 74 24 54 3
N u m b e r  o f  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s 00011003 1 4 1 9
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g . 00000001 1 4 1 5
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g . 0000000101
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g . 0001100103
Mexico
outstanding concessions 9 23 34 45 61 67 66 52 48 56 58 58
N u m b e r  o f  r e n e g o t i a t i o n s0118 1 2 1 4 2 1 1 13200 7 3
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g .0001012010005
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g .0000 1 0 1 3 1 9 1 12200 5 7
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g .011720000000 1 1
All countries
o u t s t a n d i n g  c o n c e s s i o n s1 03 83 85 07 8 1 0 3 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 5 6 1 8 7 1 8 7 1 6 5 0
Number of renegotiations 0 13 3 9 12 14 23 15 15 11 27 20 162
F i r m - l e d  r e n e g .0 1 2220133 1 141 1 4 5 3
G o v t - l e d  r e n e g .0000 1 0 1 3 1 9 1 137 2 56 9 4
J o i n t - l e d  r e n e g .011720111010 1 5
23T a b l e3 :R e n e g o t i a t i o n sb yt y p eo fi n i t i a t o ra n ds e c t o r
Period 1989/2000 Transport Water Total
Air Bus Rail Road Port PotabSewer Composite
Argentina
outstanding concessions 1 12 21 4 38 5 5 43
Number of renegotiations 1 12 18 0 31 2 2 33
Firm-led reneg. 0 12 18 0 30 2 2 32
Govt-led reneg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Joint-led reneg. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Brazil
outstanding concessions 9 19 8 36 3 8 13 24 60
Number of renegotiations 0 15 0 15 3 7 11 21 36
Firm-led reneg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Govt-led reneg. 0 15 0 15 3 7 11 21 36
Joint-led reneg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile
outstanding concessions 5 14 4 23 2 2 25
Number of renegotiations 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Firm-led reneg. 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Govt-led reneg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Joint-led reneg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia
outstanding concessions 5 17 19 41 7 7 48
Number of renegotiations 1 12 6 19 0 0 19
Firm-led reneg. 0 11 4 15 0 0 15
Govt-led reneg. 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Joint-led reneg. 1 0 2 3 0 0 3
Mexico
outstanding concessions 2 6 36 36 80 6 42 3 51 131
Number of renegotiations 0 0 33 0 33 6 31 3 40 73
Firm-led reneg. 0 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 5
Govt-led reneg. 0 0 19 0 19 6 29 3 38 57
Joint-led reneg. 0 0 11 0 11 0 0 0 0 11
All countries
outstanding concessions 12 1 27 107 71 218 14 50 25 89 307
Number of renegotiations 1 1 12 79 6 99 11 38 14 63 162
Firm-led reneg. 0 0 12 33 4 49 2 2 0 4 53
Govt-led reneg. 0 0 0 35 0 35 9 36 14 59 94
Joint-led reneg. 1 1 0 11 2 15 0 0 0 0 15
162 out of 307 projects were renegotiated, with 53 ﬁrms’ calls, 15 joint
calls and 94 governments’ call. These government-led renegotiations appear
to be concentrated in Brazil (36), Mexico (57) and Colombia (1). The Brazil-
ian wave of renegotiation occurred between 1997 and 2000, with a peak in
1999 (24). In Mexico, it was between 1993 and 1998, with more than 10
renegotiations in each year from 1993 to 1996, and a peak of 19 in 1995 (see
Table 4 below).
Table 4: Govt-led renegotiations by country, year and sector
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Brazil 0/1 0/5 15/9 0/6 15/21
Colombia 1/0 1/0
Mexico 5/5 8/5 3/16 1/10 2/0 0/2 19/38
(Renegotiations in the transport sector/ Renegotiations in the water sector)
24As for the sector allocation, renegotiated transport projects are exclu-
sively road projects (15 in Brazil, 1 in Colombia and 19 in Mexico). Renego-
tiated water projects are more evenly distributed: Of the 21 Brazilian cases,
3 were in potable water, 7 in sewer, and 11 in composite projects, while of the
38 Mexican cases, 6 were in potable water, 29 in sewer, and 3 in composite
projects.
The most quoted reasons for the renegotiation calls are the need to ad-
just tariﬀso rr e d e ﬁne investment, often in the light of demand levels that
appeared to be signiﬁcantly lower than was initially expected. Indeed, high-
way traﬃc forecasts have generally been too optimistic, with subsequent
traﬃc shortfall of 60% in Mexico and 40% in Colombia. This was probably
due to the willingness to make concessions more attractive to investors. The
impact of currency devaluation provoking the bankruptcy of the operator
has also been a frequent occurrence, especially in Mexico. This led either to
ar e d e ﬁnition of the initial contract with more advantageous clauses for the
concessionaire, including longer duration, new tariﬀs and in some cases gov-
ernment subsidies, or to the government taking-over the project (20 cases).
Finally, there are also a few cases where the concessionaire was not complying
with the terms of the project and the contract was cancelled or suspended
(16 cases)20.
3.2 Timing of Renegotiations
To contrast the relevance of our theoretical approach, we start by analyz-
ing the timing of the diﬀerent types of renegotiation, in particular with
respect to election deadlines. Figure 3 shows the number of government-
and concessionaire-led renegotiations, disaggregating them by looking at
how many elections took place during the life of the project. As is ap-
parent, government-led renegotiations tend to be strongly concentrated after
the ﬁrst election (79% of the total), while concessionaire-led ones are more
evenly distributed and take place almost with equal frequency after 0, 1, or
2 elections21.
20See Harris, Hodges, Schur and Shukla (2003).
21Note that a representation of sample hazard rates, showing these ﬁgures as percentages
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Figure 3: Elections and the timing of renegotiations
We conﬁrm these stylized facts in the probit analysis. Indeed, results not
shown here indicate that a lagged dummy for the ﬁrst election is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level on the probability of government-led renegoti-
ation, with a marginal eﬀect slightly above 10%, while it is negative and not
signiﬁcant for ﬁrm-led renegotiation. Overall, this gives a picture consistent
with our model assumption, namely that concessionaire-led renegotiations
tend to occur mainly for contractual reasons or in response to adverse unex-
pected shocks, while government-led renegotiations are generally politically
motivated and are likely to follow elections. A more accurate analysis would
need to take into account political changes occurring through elections, both
at the national and the local level. The speciﬁcity of Latin American poli-
tics, however, makes it diﬃcult to identify political changes. For example,
newly elected governments or parliamentary majorities responding to the
same party as their predecessor very often come from a diﬀerent faction of
this party, with very diﬀerent political agenda, and should thus be considered
as representing a political change. A striking example is the assassination
of Donald Collosio, the Mexican oﬃcially designated presidential candidate
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), in December 1994, which is
thought to have been ordered by members of its own party. Thus, while
the PRI remained in power after Mexico’s 1995 elections and we would not
formally classify this transition as a political change, there is some indica-
tion that a diﬀerent political group actually became dominant at that time.
26This is clearly relevant to renegotiations in Mexico at the initiative of the
government in our sample, as 34 of the 57 cases occurred in or after 1995.
Finally, many concessions in our sample, especially in water and some toll
road projects, have a local scope, which makes political changes occurring
after municipal or regional elections the relevant ones. Indeed, preliminary
tests with partial data conﬁrm the pattern of Figure 3.
3.3 Methodology
Given the expression for π(x), and the comparative statics already discussed
in GLS, it is possible to derive from the model a set of predictions for the ef-
fect of diﬀerent variables on the probability of government-led renegotiation.
These prediction, together with the details about the empirical proxies that
will be used to test them in the following section, are in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Prediction of the model and empirical proxies
Variables of the 
theoretical model 
 








Renegotiation initiated by the government: Dummy variable indicating 
whether there was or not a renegotiation of the concession contract at the 







determines the power 
of incentives 





Sunk cost F 
Investment requirements: Dummy variable indicating whether there are or 
not investment requirements as part of the concession contract, investment 






Private financing K  Private financing: Dummy variable indicating whether the project is 
funded entirely through private funds, excluding any public investment. 
ambiguous   reversed 
Shocks ε  Growth / Exchange rate shocks: internal or external macroeconomic shocks 
that impact either cost or demand of the firms. 
- same 
Institutional quality θ  Indices of corruption / rule of law / bureaucratic quality: standard 







Elections: Changes of the political majority are considered to trigger offer 
to renegotiate from the new government. 
Existence of regulator: Dummy variable indicating whether there was a 
regulator or no at the time the contract was signed. The existence of a 











T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n th e r ei st h a tt h ee ﬀect of any variable having an
impact on the probability of renegotiation through the enforcement eﬀort of
the government, π(x), will have opposite eﬀects, in terms of sign, on the
probability of renegotiation at the initiative of the concessionaire versus the
27government22. T h i si si np a r t i c u l a rt h ec a s eo ft h eﬁnancing variables, K
and F, and of the institutional quality variables θ, for example corruption.
On the other hand, the eﬀects of shocks or of the existence of a regulator,
appear to be unchanged.
Tables 7 to 9 present the results from random probit estimations, using
as dependent variable the dummy indicating, for each project i in country n,
whether there is a renegotiation initiated by the government at time t,w h e r e
t varies between 1989 and 2000. Additionally, Table 10 presents robustness
checks using as a dependent variable the dummy variable indicating whether
there is a renegotiation initiated by the government or by both parties (Tables
7 to 10 are in the Appendix). The model, which is a linearized version of the
theoretical equation giving the probability of renegotiation, is the following:
yint =1[ y
∗
int = xiα1 + α3zint + Entα3 + eint < 0], (33)
where 1[.] is the indicator function taking value 1 whenever the statement
in brackets is true, and 0 otherwise; yint is the binary variable indicating
whether concession i,i nc o u n t r yn,a tt i m et, was renegotiated or not at the
initiative of the government; xi is a vector of time invariant characteristics
of the concession contracts; zint is the number of years, since the award of
concession i,i nc o u n t r yn; Ent is a vector of environmental characteristics
(macroeconomic indicators, elections and institutional indices); eint is the
error term; and α1, α2,a n dα3 are the vectors of parameters corresponding
to xi, zint and Ent respectively.
Table 7 shows the basic speciﬁcations. Table 8 presents instrumental
variable estimations, where we make use of a two-stage procedure to address
the potential endogeneity of contract clauses23.T a b l e 9 i n t r o d u c e s s o m e
additional variables and interactions related to institutional and political
aspects.
We instrument the variables found to be endogenous applying the sim-
ple Rivers-Vuong (1988) test. The instruments are sectors, corruption, bu-
reaucracy quality, rule of law, and existence of regulatory body, which are
exogenous in the sense that they are not determined by the risk of potential
22The absolute magnitude of the eﬀects, however, may vary.
23Although such an estimation is in principle biased when the endogenous variable is
binary (see Wooldridge, 2002), support for it can be found in Angrist (1991) who states that
the bias is negligible. The second stage standard errors are computed using a bootstrapping
procedure. See a more detailed discussion in GLS.
28renegotiations. In particular, think of the institutional variables as aﬀecting
renegotiation of individual concessions only indirectly through their eﬀect
on the broader business and legal environment (the variable θ in the model)
and thus on the choice of contract clauses. Even if a case is made for any
of these variable to enter the equation explaining renegotiation, note that
identiﬁcation would still ensured by the non-linearity of the model. Table 6
summarizes the results of the test, which standard errors are bootstrapped
to account of the potential correlation of errors over time:
Table 6: Exogeneity tests
Variable Rivers-Vuong  test:  Exogeneity 
Price cap  Rejected at 1% 
Investment requirements  Accepted 
Private financing  Rejected at 10% 
Award criteria  Accepted 
Arbitration Process  Accepted 
Minimum income guarantee  Rejected at 5% 
Bidding process  Accepted 
 
Note that there are good intuitive reasons for the results of the exogeneity
test. Indeed, we would expect contractual aspects that are routinely prede-
termined to be exogenous as they are unlikely to be altered by subsequent
strategic interactions between the government and potential concessionaires.
This is obviously the case of the award criteria, the inclusion of an arbitration
process, which generally depends on the existing legal framework, and the
fact that the concession is awarded through a bid (used in 89% of the cases).
On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that concessions are granted on
the basis of materials that focus on technical criteria and investment require-
ments but are drafted in the absence of sector laws and regulatory expertise
and only weakly delineate what future regulation and tariﬀ adjustment rules
would be (Guasch, 2004). Similarly, as argued in GLS, both the structure
of ﬁnancing and the inclusion of guarantee clauses are likely to result from
strategic considerations concerning the attractiveness of a concession to pri-
vate operators and the degree of risk involved.
29Before going to the results, we discuss brieﬂyt h eﬁrst stage estimations
for the three variables deemed endogenous. The choice of regulation ap-
pears to hinge mostly on the quality of institutions. Price cap regulation is
less likely when the bureaucracy is more eﬃcient, capturing perhaps the en-
hanced ability of bureaucrats to manage informationally demanding schemes
like rate of return regulation. On the other hand, more generic measures like
corruption and rule of law appear to have the opposite eﬀect. One possibility
is that price caps are less attractive for government in environments charac-
terized by higher risk of bribery and weak enforcement. However, overall the
bureaucratic eﬃciency eﬀect seems to dominate.
As for exclusive private ﬁnancing, it dominates in the transport sector
(private operators may be less willing to assume alone the huge and ex ante
uncertain modernization costs of obsolete water delivery systems). The exis-
tence of a regulator ex ante also increases the probability of some government
participation in ﬁnancing, maybe because it represents the implicit guaran-
tee of better administrative control over the project. A better bureaucracy
makes private ﬁnancing more likely, probably capturing the fact that better
bureaucrats ﬁnd it easier to convince private investors of the convenience to
invest. As for corruption, it has the opposite eﬀect, which can be related to
the eﬀect commonly observed in FDI studies, showing that private investors
prefer direct involvement in situation of weak governance for risk sharing
purposes (Straub, 2005).
Finally, minimum income guarantee clauses are especially prevalent in
transport projects, probably due to the high uncertainty surrounding future
demand and as a way to make them attractive to private investors (see Engel
et al. 2003 and INCO, 2004). Such clauses also appear to be more likely when
a regulator is present.
3.4 Results
We present the main results for the determinants of government-led renegoti-
ation below, making special mention of how they relate to similar estimations
in GLS. We discuss ﬁrst the core variables.
- The existence of a regulatory body is again negative and signiﬁcant most
o ft h et i m e .I t se c o n o m i ci m p a c t ,h o w e v e r ,a p p e a r st ob es m a l l e r( a b o u th a l f)
of what it is for ﬁrm-led renegotiations. Also, we again observe that it loses
statistical signiﬁcance when instrumental estimations are performed, which
we interpret as being linked to the fact that this variable is used in the ﬁrst
30stage estimation and that it is eﬀective through better contract clauses.
- The price cap variable, which is one of the most important result in the
context of ﬁrm-led renegotiations, does not yield consistent results in Table
7. It does however when instrumented in Table 8, being again positive and
strongly signiﬁcant. Thus, the risk eﬀect of price cap regulation (renegotia-
tion to relax an excessively stringent cap) appears to dominate a potential
rent-shifting motive (government renegotiation to limit excessive rents due
to a loose cap).
- Duration since award is positive and very signiﬁcant, and its marginal
eﬀect is slightly stronger than on ﬁrm-led renegotiations (between 0.8 and
1.5% increase in probability for each additional year, against 0.3 to 0.6%
previously).
- The existence of investment requirements is negative and generally not
signiﬁcant in Table 7. Note that here exogeneity is accepted by the test al-
though it was rejected in the case of ﬁrm-led renegotiations. If instrumented,
the investment variable changes sign and becomes positive and strongly sig-
niﬁcant, which is exactly the contrary of the ﬁndings in the case of ﬁrm-led
renegotiations24.
- Exclusive private ﬁnancing has a reducing eﬀect on the probability of
renegotiations (the reverse of the pattern observed for ﬁrm-led renegotia-
tions), and appears to be strongly signiﬁcant both in Table 7 and when
instrumented in Table 8. Its marginal eﬀect is also much stronger here and
is up to 5%.
- The quality of bureaucracy is still negative and signiﬁcant throughout,
and its economic impact is now slightly above 1%. However, the corrup-
tion variable, whether introduced alone or together with the quality of bu-
reaucracy index, is positive and signiﬁcant in Table 7, meaning that a less
corrupt environment is conducive to more renegotiation. This is consistent
with our theoretical framework that implies a reverse eﬀect for that variable.
Intuitively, the quality of the bureaucracy dimension may be related to a
contract-improving eﬀect similar to the one linked to the existence of a reg-
ulator, while corruption would capture the standard eﬀect through the π(x)
function.
- The lagged election variable is still positive, implying more renegotia-
tions after national elections. Its signiﬁcance varies between 0.2 and 0.6%
depending on what other variables are included in the speciﬁcation.
24Results, not shown here to save space, are available upon request from the authors.
31- The economic cycle has again an impact on the probability of renegotia-
tions, with lagged growth shocks implying more renegotiations. They appear
however to matter slightly less (this makes sense if a signiﬁcant fraction of
them are rather linked to the political cycle) and in a diﬀerent way than
for ﬁrm-led renegotiations: The marginal eﬀect is lower (around +0.2 and
+0.1% after one and two years respectively for each one-point decrease in
the growth rate), and the eﬀect is stronger with a one year lag and decreases
after that. A similar pattern is observed for exchange rate shocks25.
Additional variables introduced in Table 7 include:
- The existence of an arbitration process, which we had previously related
to the cost of renegotiation δ, is here negative and signiﬁcant (column 3).
Exogeneity is accepted for this variable.
- Minimum income guarantee is consistently positive and strongly signif-
icant, and this carries over when it is instrumented (Table 8). Its marginal
eﬀect is quite strong (around 5%), which indicates the inappropriateness of
such clauses. In the case of Colombia’s road program, the cumulated amount
of guarantees due by the State to concessionaires as of 2004 amounts approx-
imately to the equivalent of US$100 million, threatening to weight heavily on
future ﬁscal results. For this reason, least present value of revenue auctions
have been introduced for new concessions awards, as a way to substitute for
this type of guarantees (INCO, 2004).
- The existence of a bidding process previous to the award of the conces-
sion is positive but not signiﬁcant (column 4).
- A dummy variable classifying award criteria (1 for highest price, highest
canon or lowest subsidy, hence monetary transfer considerations not prone
to subsequent interpretational subjectivity, 0 for others), shows up negative
and signiﬁcant (table 7, column 7). Note that exogeneity is accepted for that
variable. Looking in more details at speciﬁc award criteria, it appears that
three of them are signiﬁcant: lowest tariﬀ and best plan (where the criterion
is based on evaluating business plans that include service parameters, invest-
ment commitment and the record of the concessionaire) have a signiﬁcant
and negative impact on the probability of renegotiation, both with marginal
eﬀects near 1%, while shortest duration (where the concession is awarded
to the bidder seeking the shortest duration of exclusive operating rights) is
signiﬁcantly positive and its marginal eﬀect is around 13%26.
25Results are not shown here to save space.
26These results call for further inquiry, but are left for future research. See Engel, Fischer
32Table 11 summarizes the results by showing the sign of the main determi-
nants found to have an eﬀect on both types of renegotiations. In particular,
it highlights (shaded rows) that the sign of the investment, private ﬁnancing
and corruption variables are indeed reversed, which provides supports for the
theoretical model presented in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp a p e r .
T a b l e1 1 :C o m p a r a t i v es u m m a r yo ft h er e s u l t s
 Government-led  renegotiation Firm-led  renegotiation 
Existence of a regulator  Negative Negative 
Price cap regulation  Positive Positive 
Duration  Positive Positive 
Investment requirements  Positive  Negative 
Exclusive private financing  Negative  Positive 
Quality of bureaucracy  Negative Negative 
Corruption  Positive  Negative 
Elections (lagged)  Positive Positive 
Growth (lagged)  Negative Negative 
Minimum income guarantee  Positive Positive 
 
Moreover, several results with strong policy implications are unchanged,
namely the fragility of price cap regulation, the fact that having a regula-
tor in place when signing a concession contract and setting up a regulatory
framework reduces the frequency of future renegotiation calls, and the inad-
equacy of minimum income guarantee clauses. The next section digs further
into the institutional and regulatory environment of successful concessions.
3.5 Institutional and Political Aspects
Table 9 introduces additional variables and interactions, meant to explore
further the impact of institutional and political aspects.
In column 1 and 2, we introduce the fact that the regulator is part of
the government ministry or not. This variable, which can be interpreted
as a proxy for the autonomy of the regulatory body, has a strong positive
and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of renegotiations (marginal eﬀect
and Galetovic (2001 and 2003) for a discussion of award criteria, including their proposal
of a least present value of revenue auction.
33around 1%)27. Therefore, it appears that a regulator enjoying some degree of
independence from the politicians in charge is much more eﬀective in limiting
renegotiation. Interestingly, the inclusion of this variable does not aﬀect the
signiﬁcance and sign of the “existence of a regulatory body” variable. Note
ﬁnally that it has exactly the opposite eﬀect when the dependent variable
is concessionaire-led renegotiations. This result can be tentatively related to
the one on corruption. We investigate further on this possibility below.
In column 2, we substitute the lagged election variable by a more focused
variable, i.e. a dummy indicating eﬀective political changes following these
elections. This variable is deﬁned by imputing as changes cases in which
there was a shift in the dominant party majority in Congress, or a new
president coming from a diﬀerent party than his or her predecessor (see
discussion above). This speciﬁcation improves a little on the election variable.
Considering other speciﬁcations not included here, the results are however
comparable. As mentioned before, the scope of many concessions (especially
in water) are limited to local or regional political districts, so we would
need to construct similar reliable variables (elections and eﬀective changes
of majority) at the level of the relevant local elections to be able to test the
eﬀect of political turnover more precisely.
In column 3, we interact the dummy variable for the existence of a reg-
ulator with the corruption index. The interaction is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, while the dummy for the existence of a regulator remains
negative and signiﬁcant. Considering that a higher value of the corruption
index corresponds to a less corrupt environment, this can be interpreted by
saying that the stronger corruption, the more important the eﬀect of having a
regulator in place to limit the incidence of renegotiations. This results tends
to indicate that the impact of a regulatory body is especially important in
weak governance environments.
In column 4, we interact the quality of the bureaucracy index with the
election variable, to see if the eﬀect of political cycles is aﬀected by the
general perceived quality of institutions. The interaction comes out negative
and signiﬁcant, and so do the two interacted variables. This shows that
the better the bureaucracy, the milder the post-election eﬀect. In column
27Arguably, not being part of a ministry does not guarantee operative autonomy, as
other indirect form of political interference may exist. See Cubbin and Stern (2005)
and Wallsten (2001), for cross-country evidence that improved regulatory independence
and quality have a positive impact on performance and eﬃciency in the electricity and
telecommunication sectors respectively.
345 a similar result is obtained by interacting the election variable with the
corruption index (negative and signiﬁcant sign), and in column 6, we combine
the interaction between the existence of a regulator and the corruption index
with that of the election variable with the corruption index, and still obtain
t h es a m er e s u l t sf o rb o t h .
Overall the results in Table 9 give additional evidence of the fact that
strong regulatory mechanisms are specially important when the institutional
quality is low. In this context, experienced and independent regulators are
likely to act as barriers against political opportunism.
3.6 Robustness Checks
In our model, government-led renegotiations are both Pareto improving and
rent shifting ones. Empirically, our sample contains a small number of rene-
gotiations that are considered to be the result of a joint call. As discussed
in GLS, this may both reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tt h er e n e g o t i a t i o nw a sd e s i r e d
by both parties or that there was not a clear case to attribute the call, as
with some Mexican road projects. In any case, it can be argued that joint
calls are close in nature to Pareto improving government calls, so Table 10
(see Appendix) presents robustness checks using as a dependent variable the
dummy variable indicating whether there is a renegotiation initiated by the
government or by both parties. Overall, the main results are unchanged.
Some noticeable diﬀerences include:
-T h em a r g i n a le ﬀect of private ﬁnancing is stronger and up to 10%.
-T h es i g n i ﬁcance of the lagged election variable is reinforced. In this
case, it is signiﬁcant at the 1 or 5% level in all cases and its marginal eﬀect
is around 2%.
- The existence of a bidding process becomes weakly signiﬁcant (positive
and signiﬁcant at 10% level with a marginal eﬀect near 3%).
4 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have built a model of renegotiation of concession contracts in which the
principal, the government, initiates both Pareto improving and rent-shifting
renegotiations. Moreover, we have tested its predictions with a sample of 307
Latin American transport and water concessions in the 1990s.
35Overall, the analysis of government-led renegotiations conﬁrms some of
the main insight that Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub (2003) presented with re-
spect to ﬁrm-led renegotiation. Concessions’ fragility is due to a mix of ﬂaws
in contract design, inadequate regulatory frameworks and deﬁcient institu-
tional environments, and the impact of macroeconomic shocks. Key results
are again the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding con-
cessions and the sensitivity of price cap regulated concessions to shocks.
There are, however, important diﬀerences with ﬁrm-led renegotiations.
Most importantly, the ﬁnancing variables (those aﬀecting the status quo
payoﬀs of the renegotiating parties, and especially the exclusivity of private
ﬁnancing) tend to come out with reversed signs, which is what we should
expect from the way they aﬀect the ﬁrm and the government in the bargaining
process. Moreover, a proxy for the autonomy of the regulator also comes out
with reversed sign, as does the corruption variable.
The main additional policy insights come from better and more precise
evidence of the link between the regulatory framework and the institutional
and political environment. Indeed, it appears that having eﬃcient and in-
dependent regulatory authorities in place when awarding concessions is es-
pecially important because it helps limit the damaging eﬀects of corruption,
weakness in the rule of law and the bureaucratic framework, as well as the
potential strategic behavior of the government following changes in power.
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386 Appendix
In the case with limited liability but without political turnover, this condi-
tion, spelled out for the general model in footnote 13 of Guasch, Laﬀont and














+( 1− π(x))P [−A].
The structure of rents giving rise to this condition is shown in the ﬁgure
below:






















Rent accruing to good ﬁrm cheating (1 period)
In the present case, we must consider the additional fact that at t =2
there is a probability 1 − q that qL be increased to the ﬁrst best level q∗,
giving rise to a higher rent for a cheating ﬁrm. Note that we do not explicitly
distinguish the case of outright expropriation (probability (1 − q)µ), as the
production level and thus the good ﬁrm’s rent remain the same. The next
ﬁg u r es h o w st h i sm o d i ﬁed rent proﬁle:
39t=1. Good firm
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Given this, the constraint ensuring truthful behavior from the good type
















Setting q =0gives the constraint in the text.
40Table 7: Random effect probit panel 
Basic estimations 
 




















































































































   -2.99* 
(0.61) 
    
Bidding process 
 
    0.51 
(0.43) 
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(0.43) 
 


































































Number  of  obs.  1267 1132 1100 1132 1132 1127 1132 
Log  Likelihood  -267.08 -173.70 -151.72 -172.94 -163.95 -160.58 -168.33 
Marginal effects (dy/dx)
a 
y = Pr (renegotiation=1)  0.036  0.009  0.0004  0.009  0.004  0.002  0.005 
Existence of regulatory 
body
 
-0.012 -0.041 -0.016 -0.035 0.004  -0.21  -0.32 
Price  cap    0.004 -0.022 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 




  -0.012 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 
Private  financing    -0.055 -0.002 -0.047 -0.024 -0.013 -0.032 
Bureaucratic  quality  -0.041 -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 
Arbitration  process     -0.071      
Bidding  process      0.008     
Corruption         0.012    
Minimum income 
guarantee 
      0.048   
Award  criteria         -0.013 
Election-1  0.045 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 
GDP growth –1  -0.005  -0.002  -0.0002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 




-0.119 -0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.055 -0.021 0.002 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an 
increase by 1 unit. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) level.
41Table 8: Random effect probit panel 
Instrumental variable estimations 
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Number  of  obs.  1132 1132 1132 1132 
Log Likelihood  -163.95  -186.84  -178.63  -171.27 
Marginal effects (dy/dx)
a 
y = Pr (renegotiation=1)  0.004  0.017  0.010  0.006 
Existence of regulatory body
  0.003 -0.065 0.012 -0.238 
Price cap  -0.081  0.006  0.167  0.029 
Duration since award  0.005  0.011  0.008  0.005 
Investment requirements
  -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 
Private  financing  -0.023 -0.135 -0.018 -0.093 
Bureaucratic  quality  -0.002 0.008 -0.001 0.022 
Minimum income guarantee        0.252 
Election-1 0.002  0.002  0.0002  0.001 
GDP growth –1  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
GDP growth –2  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
Transport sector dummy
  -0.085 -0.192 -0.138 -0.165 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an 
increase by 1 unit. 
Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped estimates based on 100 replications. The significance level (1% (*), 5% (**) 
and 10% (***)) is assessed using the percentile confidence interval. For example, for the 95% interval, the bottom endpoint is 
the 2.5
th percentile and the upper endpoint is the 97.5
th percentile. If the confidence interval build in that way contains 0, the 
coefficient is not significant. Non-normality of the distribution may explain that coefficients are deemed significant while 
having relatively large standard errors. 
42Table 9: Random effect probit panel 
Additional results on institutional aspects 
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Number  of  obs.  1127 1127 1132 1132 1132 1132 
Log  Likelihood  -171.44 -170.51 -157.90 -170.90 -159.73 -152.22 
Marginal effects (dy/dx)
a 
y = Pr (renegotiation=1)  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.008  0.002  0.001 
Existence of regulatory 
body
 
-0.029 -0.033 -0.324 -0.044 -0.003 -0.909 
Regulatory body is part 
of the Govt. Ministry 
0.010  0.011      
Existence of reg. * 
Corruption 
   0.011     0.008 
Price  cap  0.003  0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 




-0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 
Private  financing  -0.043 -0.041 -0.016 -0.054 -0.015 -0.007 
Bureaucratic quality  -0.009  -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 
Corruption       0.012  -0.001 
Election-1 0.004    0.003  0.255  0.196  0.200 
Election-1 * 
Bureaucratic quality 
    - 0 . 0 1 6     
Election-1  *  Corruption       -0.006  -0.004 
Effective Political 
change -1 
  0.006      
GDP  growth  –1  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 




-0.004 -0.001 -0.026 -0.004 0.048 -0.010 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it corresponds to an 
increase by 1 unit. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) level.
43Table 10: Random effect probit panel 
Robustness checks 
 





























by Govt or 
both 


























































































Arbitration process      -1.76* 
(0.34) 
    
Bidding process 
 
    0.62*** 
(0.35) 
   





      0.92* 
(0.24) 
 


































































Number  of  obs.  1267 1132 1100 1132 1132 1127 1132 
Log  Likelihood  -312.83 -226.68 -206.30 -225.02 -220.66 -218.31 -222.24 
Marginal effects (dy/dx)
a 
y = Pr (renegotiation=1)  0.054  0.028  0.015  0.027  0.025  0.021  0.024 
Existence of regulatory 
body
 
-0.011 -0.045 -0.039 -0.037 -0.007 -0.042 -0.041 
Price cap    -0.001  -0.051  -0.028 -0.028 -0.035 0.008 




  -0.014  -0.0003  -0.010 -0.017 -0.014 -0.014 
Private  financing    -0.099 -0.016 -0.083 -0.069 -0.062 -0.076 
Bureaucratic quality  -0.055  -0.028  -0.011 -0.029 -0.032 -0.018 -0.020 
Arbitration  process    -0.141      
Bidding  process      0.027     
Corruption       0.029    
Minimum income 
guarantee 
      0.074   
Award  criteria         -0.034 
Election-1  0.065 0.023 0.019 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.021 
GDP growth –1  -0.004  -0.002  -0.0002  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 




-0.126 0.017 0.014 -0.020 -0.068 -0.058 -0.001 
(a) For dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, it  
corresponds to an increase by 1 unit. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) and 10% (***) level.
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